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A four-day conference organised by CEESP in collaboration with the Social Science Research Council,
New York, brought together leading thinkers on the subject of governance in August this year. The objec-
tive of Beyond Governance, which took place in Murree, Pakistan, was to apply an emerging understand-
ing of governance to a concrete issue – within a regional context – in this case South Asia. Through a
selection of papers and extracts of papers presented in Murree, Policy Matters examines the issue of gov-
ernance from a number of different perspectives, leading with a critical examination of the concept of gov-
ernance and its current uses, extracted from a longer paper by Professor Matthias Finger.
The special importance of both the concept and the practice of governance stems from the fact that globalisation
has profoundly altered the premises of and the ground-rules for traditional nation-state politics. As traditional, local,
national and international political institutions are no longer adequate to meet the challenges created by the pro-
cess of industrial development, ‘governance’ emerges as a new concept, directly related to the process of glob-
alisation. 
Globalisation is defined here as the latest stage of a process where technological, economic, ecological, cultural,
and military trends, traditionally observable on a geographically limited scale and scope, are extended to the entire
globe. First separately, but increasingly in a synergistic manner – and therefore ever accelerating - these trends
lead to the emergence of new players with new and different (power) relationships among them. Let me briefly
comment here on each of these five trends separately.
Technological globalisation – which is the result of global scientific development – is certainly most fundamental,
as this is the process which underlies and accelerates most if not all other processes, in particular those of eco-
nomic and cultural globalisation. Key players are techno-scientific institutions, whose aim is to make scientific
progress useful for commercial and political interests. As almost all of these institutions work with the same sci-
entific rationality, the outcomes of technological globalisation are quite homogeneous.
The field of communication perfectly illustrates how technological globalisation influences cultural globalisation .
Indeed, whether it is because of the media, communication or tourism, more and more inhabitants of the planet
share the same cultural references and define themselves in respect to the same dreams, mostly American ones.
This, of course, leads to a certain uniformity, as well as a loss of cultural diversity (e.g., Ritzer, 1998). However,
this process of cultural globalisation is not necessarily synonymous with cultural homogenisation, since this new
‘global culture’ is often fragmented and incoherent, victim as it is of rapidly changing fads and fashions. The main
actors here are media and entertainment conglomerates, which are in fewer and fewer hands. One must also
mention that parallel to the standardisation of culture one can observe a localisation and so-called “ethno-isation”
as a reaction to it. 
It is in the area of economy and business that the phenomenon of globalisation has probably been best studied
(e.g., Barnet & Cavanagh, 1994; Dunning, 1993;), and often equated to globalisation per se. However, one must
distinguish here between the globalisation of the financial networks (which are by now almost totally integrated),
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CEESP CONTACTS
Letter from the Chair
I wish to start by welcoming Nigel Cross as the new
Executive Director of IIED. Nigel brings extensive experience
working on the ground – particularly in the Sahel – and is a
skilful manager and communicator. I am sure that, under his
leadership, IIED faces a very successful future.
Catherine McCloskey will shortly be departing on maternity
leave. Her absence will be felt throughout. Catherine has run
the Secretariat so well, kept the newsletter going and made
continuous improvements in its quality, and acted as the
intermediary between the outside world (including CEESP
members) and the CEESP Steering Committee. She will be
sorely missed by all of us. 
During Catherine’s absence, Erika Spanger-Siegfried of the
Stockholm Environment Institute’s Boston Center will be fill -
ing in; for the time being, you can refer Secretariat and
newsletter questions to her.
In the months leading up to her leave, Catherine has taken
part in the re-invigoration of the Collaborative Management
Working Group, set up in 1996 to assist the IUCN Secretariat
in an ambitious programme of work. Sadly, with the sudden
departure in 1998 of Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend, former head
of the IUCN Social Policy Group, the CMWG ran into
resource difficulties – both human and financial, as the
Programme’s priorities shifted away from collaborative man-
agement. Over the past few months, a number of key mem-
bers of the CMWG with the support of IIED, have taken steps
to revitalise the group, starting with the preparation of a third
issue of CM News, enclosed here. It reports on a number of
exciting projects currently being undertaken around the world
and is testament to the ongoing enthusiasm of CM members.
It is hoped that resources will be found to build on this work,
to establish a clear mandate for the Group, to continue sup-
porting IIED in preparing a regular newsletter – and estab-
lishing a CMWG website.
In a related development, CEESP is finalising arrangements
with IUCN’s World Commission on Protected Areas to launch
a joint Task Force on Collaborative Management and Pro-
tected Areas. The discussions began in 1998, with the active
involvement of CM Forum members, and have led to a con-
sensus on the terms and objectives of the proposed Task
Force. These include promotion of greater understanding
and wider application of co-management initiatives related to
the management of protected areas, as well as
cataloguing and classifying the co-management
approaches currently in use. These efforts will
lead to a workshop at the fifth World Parks
Congress, in 2002. Yves Renard, CMWG Chair,
and Adrian Phillips, WCPA Chair, have request-
ed Ashish Khotari to lead the group. Our thanks
to Ashish for taking on this role. 
In August, Adil Najam represented CEESP at
the Regional Scoping Meeting on Climate
Change, organised by ROSA in Johannesburg,
South Africa. The participants recommended
that IUCN’s Climate Initiative should focus on
the interface between climate change and sus-
tainable development, as this was most mean-
ingful from a developing country (and especially
Southern African) perspective. Subsequently, I
addressed the Ottawa Ministerial Forum, and a
policy workshop organised in Bangkok by the
Asian Development Bank for Asian policy mak-
ers. In general, there is a much greater aware-
ness of the concern for linking climate change
mitigation and sustainable development in order
to get Southern countries on board. This is also
consistent with the direction of the discussion in
the IPCC. A number of CEESP and Ring mem-
bers are involved in international climate change
discussions as part of IPCC writing teams. I am
thinking of ways in which their counsel could be
used more effectively by IUCN as it tries to
establish its niche in this area.
The focus of this issue of the newsletter is on
governance. This was the subject of a recent
conference organised by CEESP jointly with the
Pakistan Environment Program, and the Social
Science Research Council. The conference
was held in Murree, Pakistan, August 25-28th.
The sustainable development community has
been tackling the issue of governance for more
than ten years. Recently, a number of people
had begun to identify what they perceived as a
significant gap between the way in which the
issue of governance is constructed in the aca-
demic and policy literature, and the way it is
experienced in the field. The former
put forth an idealistic aspect – that the
problems of governance were solvable
through simple (and often simplistic)
policy intervention. But from the field
the problem seemed quite different,
since many good reform efforts in the
past had been hijacked by a small
group of elites. In other words, it made
sense to think of solutions to the prob-
lem of governance, not as the reform
of a slightly deformed system, but as
the obstruction of a set of criminal
activities that have succeeded in
hijacking reform efforts and institutions
in the past. 
To pursue this line of thinking, we
asked a group of academic scholars of
history, anthropology, economics, polit-
ical science and literary criticism to
interact with South Asian practitioners,
representing mainly IUCN members
and Secretariat staff. It was a highly
fruitful exchange, and will lead to many
lessons of interest for the IUCN com-
munity. Papers will be compiled in 
a volume to be jointly edited by 
myself and David Ludden, Professor 
of History at the University of
Pennsylvania. 
We also took advantage of the meeting
to allow Matthias Finger, Chair of the
Governance Working Group, to meet
separately with key IUCN staff mem-
bers to discuss a position paper he is
preparing for IUCN, on global gover-
nance. The background document is
available here p.20) and on the CEESP
website at http://ws101.cisti.nrc.ca/
ceesp/. We encourage you to send
comments to Matthias Finger. 
While you are visiting the site, you
might also want to see the background
Dear Colleagues,
paper on ethics, and send comments to Franck Amalric,
Chair of the Ethics Working Group. 
Most recently, we held a three-day workshop on operational-
ising sustainable livelihoods (7-9 November) in Boston. The
goal of this scoping meeting was to identify ways in which
sustainable livelihoods can be operationalised, and to formu-
late clearly the idea of a formal, international network of
groups active in the area of sustainable livelihoods. Such a
network would draw together the knowledge, energy and
practical experience of sustainable livelihood concept cham-
pions, advocates, researchers, and practitioners.
The analogy proposed to this work is that of the Consultative
Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). It was
recalled that, in response to food crises, a network of institu-
tions focused on agricultural research functioned as a clear-
ing house of ideas and experience, as well as champions of
a concept around the world. The work of this network helped
to translate a universal theory into practical, local applica-
tions. In continuing the analogy, the meeting has adopted the
acronym, CGSL (Consultative Group for Sustainable
Livelihoods).
This analogy, however useful it is, need not be taken too lit-
erally. CGIAR has come under criticism as being overly
bureaucratised and wedded to an approach that has histori-
cally excluded key emerging concerns – especially those per-
taining to the environment and social development. 
Taking cues from, but without being confined to this
approach, the CGSL workshop aims to explore how existing
institutions and networks can be energised to operationalise
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Experts from developing countries
are increasingly affected by envi-
ronmental factors. For some, this
opens up new trade opportunities;
for others it presents additional
barriers and constraints. But what
has rarely been asked is whether
this environmentally-driven trade
contributes to poverty elimination
and broader-based development:
in sum, who benefits?
To shed light on this question, the who benefits? study reviews trends in environmen-
tally-driven trade, drawing on the experience of organic coffee exporters from
Venezuela and the South African citrus sector. It also examines the fair trade move-
ment’s approach to generating and assessing benefits and the trends towards 
convergence between environmentally and socially focused trade initiatives. The
report concludes by recommending action for increasing the social benefits of 
environmentally-driven trade.
Who benefits? is part of IIED’s Stimulating Sustainable Trade series, which examines
the impacts of social and environmental requirements on trade between the North and
South and looks at how to encourage trade in more sustainable goods and services.
It is available from the IIED bookshop, bookshop@iied.org. 
For more information about IIED’s work on sustainable trade, see the Sustainable
Consumption and Trade initiative website, www.iied.org/scati, or contact Nick Robins
or Sarah Roberts at IIED, nick.robins@iied.org; sarah.roberts@iied.org.
ally served industrial development and
its promoters, has been made obsolete
by the very process it has actively pro-
moted. And in some cases, if one reads
neo-liberal literature, the nation-state is
now the key obstacle to further growth
and economic expansion. If the win-
ners of globalisation want to do away
with the nation-state, the losers,
instead, seem to put all their hopes in
it. Indeed, many peoples, especially in
the developing countries, seem to think
that the same nation-state, which at
least in part has caused their hard-
ships, will now protect them from the
negative effects of globalisation. 
It is probably premature to say exactly
where the nation-state is heading as a
result of the numerous attempts to
adapt to and cope with globalisation.
However, it is possible to identify four
types of pressure imposed on the
nation-state by globalisation. As profits
increasingly globalise and social and
environmental costs increasingly
localise, the nation-state runs into a
structural financial problem, where it
inevitably has do more with less.
Secondly, there is a growing crisis of
legitimacy as global actors increasingly
dictate what nation-states should do
(either by bypassing or by instrumen-
talising them), and society increasingly
has reactive, defensive, and therefore
temporary demands. Along with the
structural financial problems, the
state’s declining credibility in turn leads
to a loss of political coherence and col-
lective problem-solving capacity. 
Over the past ten years or so many
new collective problem-solving mecha-
nisms, along with corresponding insti-
tutions, have emerged – a phe-
nomenon described by the concept of
‘governance’. 
At the level of society, there are also many vic-
tims of the same process, in particular those
who are least mobile socially, geographically
and professionally. At an ecological level, the
first victims of globalisation are the species and
people who depend directly on natural
resources for survival. On a cultural level we are
arguably all victims of globalisation, since for
most of us, our identity remains linked to a geo-
graphical location with a given culture and lan-
guage. Globalisation, on the other hand, has
become synonymous with a loss of roots, loss
of meaning and identity.
In short, while globalisation builds on historical
trends of rationalisation, institutionalisation,
expansion and further socio-cultural and eco-
logical degradation and exploitation, it now
seems to have reached a new stage in the form
of new and institutionalised global organisations
(TNCs, NGOs, multilateral organisations). This
new global institutional reality is, however, par-
alleled by a corresponding process of localisa-
tion, characterised mainly by its defensiveness
and reactiveness. 
What future for 
“old politics”?
The question now is what role do traditional
political players – national and local govern-
ments, international institutions, public adminis-
trations, public enterprises, political parties, and
many others more – play in the new framework.
For the nation-state, the historical unit within
which collective problems have traditionally
been addressed, this is a particularly paradoxi-
cal situation. The nation-state was, and to a cer-
tain extent still is, a significant player in all five
processes of globalisation: cultural homogeni-
sation, ecological destruction, techno-scientific
advancements (often tied to the military), mili-
tary conquest, and of economic growth and
industrial development more generally. Today, it
seems, the same nation-state, after having loy-
least mobile lose out, i.e., natural resources lose out against
workers, and workers lose out against capital. Consumption,
of course, also goes global, as culture becomes more uni-
form, and as production spreads world-wide. Consequently,
companies which produce these new global goods and ser-
vices increasingly merge, and turn the planet into one big
supermarket. Such concentration can now be found in all
sectors, some of which are already highly cartelised as a
result of economic globalisation.
Ecology has also become globalised. Since the beginning of
the 1980s, favoured by a new scientific approach called
‘Global Change’ (Malone & Roederer, 1985) the planet has
increasingly been seen as a single global system (Sachs,
1993). As a consequence, many ecological issues and prob-
lems are seen as a threat to the entire Biosphere. This is now
the case with nuclear pollution, climate change, ozone deple-
tion, biodiversity destruction, and many other resource- or
pollution-related issues. The actors of this new global eco-
logical awareness can be found in the scientific community,
among international environmental NGOs, and indigenous
peoples’ organisations (Tamiotti & Finger, forthcoming).
Even the military, traditionally very much tied to the nation-
state, has become globalised, parallel to planetary security
concerns, some of which are now of a non-military nature.
In each of these five dimensions of globalisation there are
new actors emerging for whom the playing field is now the
entire globe. Until recently, transnational corporations (TNCs)
were considered to be the most typical such new global
actors (e.g., Barnet & Cavanagh, 1994; Korten, 1995). Some
of them – with their strategic vision, their mobility, and their
economic and sometimes even political power – have
already become more powerful than many governments.
However, this same phenomenon of globalisation also
extends to civil society (Princen & Finger, 1994) in the form
of ‘multinational’ non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In
addition, new global agencies have emerged which are no
longer controlled directly by governments as in the case of
most UN agencies, the Bretton Woods institutions, such as
the GATT and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), or the World Bank
(Chossoudovsky, 1994; Danaher, 1994). These players not
only have a global strategic vision, but are among the most
active promoters of globalisation, profiting from the continua-
tion of the process.
GOVERNANCE
Governance and globalisation
(continued from page 1)
work, most often an international con-
vention.
A number of scholars have focused
their studies on the effectiveness of
international regimes, where effective-
ness can be defined as the degree to
which international environmental
accords and organisations lead to
changes in behaviour that help solve
collective problems. However, the
assessment of the effectiveness of an
international accord or regime is gener-
ally rather difficult to establish, in the
same way as is the effectiveness and
corresponding evaluation of public poli-
cies at the national level. The nature
and extent of international environmen-
tal commitments have been trans-
formed in recent years as states have
taken on more responsibilities under
treaties and agreements which are
increasingly stringent and with which




Common property resources can be
broadly defined as those in which a
group of people have co-equal rights,
specifically rights which exclude the
use of these resources by other people
(World Bank, 1992). Common Property
Resources Management Theory
(CPRMT) looks at the ways in which
individuals and groups organise them-
selves to govern and manage common
property resources. Furthermore, it
seeks to contribute to the elaboration of
a theory of self-organisation and self-
governance in a specific area, general-
ly related to specific resources (e.g.,
forests, water, fisheries, etc.) (Ostrom,
1990: 27).
becomes a model able to provide non-demo-
cratic or stateless countries with appropriate
democratic institutions. But it does not address
the interdependency and complexity of gover-
nance situations
Regime theory
Because of an increase in the number of inter-
national institutions, the growing interdependen-
cy and complexity of local and global issues,
and the emergence of new players on the inter-
national scene, it became necessary during the
1990s to redefine international public action. It is
in this context that the concept of governance
has been re-introduced mainly to describe inter-
dependencies and complexities involved in the
operation of a given community or institution,
generally limited to a geographical area and
even to a specific issue (such as, for example,
polar bears) or resources (e.g., water). The idea
is not to focus on the operation of structures, but
rather to understand the forces and powers
involved in the overall process governing the
issue in question. In the context of international
relations theory, the concept of area-specific
governance has been used at two levels,
regime theory above state level and Common
Property Resources Management Theory below
the state level.
Regime thinking has initiated a new trend in
consideration of international institutions. The
classic definition of an international regime is a
set of “principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expec-
tations converge in a given issue area”.
Consequently, regimes are centred on nation-
states, even though they can and often do
involve other players when it comes to their for-
mulation, implementation, and evaluation. In
other words, Regime Theory pertains to a spe-
cific issue generally located at the supra-nation-
al level, often involving the solution of a specific
collective problem by means of the co-operation
of nation states and other players. Such a
regime is generally grounded in a legal frame-
In the literature of political science, the idea of governance
involves a broad range of concepts. Nevertheless, four dif-
ferent schools of thought can be identified, namely structural
or good governance, regime theory, common property




Structural governance is a tendency that involves mainly the
democratic structures of a state at a national level only. In
this context, the term of governance has been mainly used
by the World Bank since the early 1990s. World Bank work-
ing papers usually refer to the more eloquent concept of
‘good governance’, introduced to address politically sensitive
questions regarding state reform in developing countries,
which were promoted in the main by international financial
institutions. While the statutes of organisations, such as the
World Bank and the IMF, expressly forbid them to take up
political issues, the use of the concept of governance has
allowed these institutions to interfere in political and social
issues without directly confronting the governments con-
cerned. The World Bank has used the concept of good gov-
ernance in a didactic manner, mainly in Africa to determine
the institutions and political practices that would be neces-
sary for the (industrial) development of a given country
(Senarclens, 1998 : 92), in other words in order to obtain
structural adjustment loans. 
The concept of good governance has also been used in the
same way within the UNCED process with the aim of creat-
ing a political climate suitable for so-called sustainable
development. In this context, governance came to be
defined as three things: the participation of states in interna-
tional law-making; the evolution of the decision-making
mechanisms of international institutions; and the participa-
tion of non-governmental entities in national and internation-
al decision-making and implementation processes. In both
the World Bank and the UNCED context the notion of (good)
governance appears to be very close to that of government,
albeit with additional participation by selected non-govern-
mental organisations (both business and not-for-profit).
Moreover, it refers to broadly accepted structures of govern-
ment, whose aim it is to define a certain way of operating
state institutions, usually modelled after Western democra-
cies, or more precisely that of the United States. It then
GOVERNANCE
CPRMT takes a stakeholder approach, where each stake-
holder is directly affected by what the others do. It also makes
very specific assumptions about the nature of the stakes.
While theoretically and conceptually very solid, it is difficult to
extrapolate CPRMT beyond the local level, beyond the area
of natural resources, and beyond some basic assumptions
about stakeholder interests.
Global governance
Global governance is certainly the most prominent, but also
the vaguest use of the term governance. It is rooted in the
idea that economic and financial globalisation have pro-
foundly redistributed economic and political power, thus chal-
lenging State authority. Since the 90s, the development of
humanitarian interventions has altered the previous basis of
inter-state order, allowing for supra-state players to increas-
ingly interfere in national and local matters. These and other
changes have been conceptualised, albeit not systematically,
by the Commission on Global Governance, meeting on a reg-
ular basis in Geneva since 1992. In a report entitled Our
Global Neighbourhood, the Commission defined the concept
of governance as follows:
“Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals
and institutions, public and private, manage their com-
mon affairs. It is a continuing process through which con-
flicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and
co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal insti -
tutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance,
as well as informal arrangements that people and institu-
tions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their
interest” (Commission on Global Governance, 1995).
Such a definition encapsulates almost everything, from the
notion of individuals working together to that of co-operation
among nation-states. Typical of UN – and particularly
UNCED – jargon, this conceptualisation does not take into
account the power differentials between individuals and insti -
tutions, or their strategic interests. By enlarging the concept
of global governance to include grassroots players and local
peoples, a number of authors have elevated civil society
players to global players, thus not only confusing levels, but
moreover ignoring the status and role of institutions. This,
however, is not to say that local levels and actions are not rel-
evant when it comes to dealing with concrete issues and day-
to-day concerns. Indeed, many international institutions and
GOVERNANCE
organisations now increasingly transfer their
capacity to implement to local players (Tamiotti
& Finger, forthcoming). This may have less to do
with an emerging global civil society than with
yet another instrumentalisation of the local by
the global, furthermore bypassing nation-states
in the process. In no way can such civil society
activities be conceptualised as an organised
counter-force to newly emerging global players.
The four conceptualisations of governance men-
tioned here all have their shortcomings, Good
Governance Theory being particularly non-origi-
nal, as it confuses governance with (American
style) government. Global Governance Theory
is closer to wishful thinking than to actual reality:
civil society and corresponding civil society
NGOs cannot be seen as being on an equal
footing with other newly emerging global actors,
such as TNCs and multilaterals. Moreover glob-
al governance is particularly a-political, and in
this respect a typical outcome of the UNCED
public relations exercise (Chatterjee & Finger,
1994). Common Property Resources
Management Theory is conceptually very
sound, but deals mainly with natural resources
management at a sub-national level. As such, it
does not really address the issue of institutions
and organised players and their interests.
Regime Theory is, in my view, the most interest-
ing and promising approach to governance, as it
identifies the supra-national level and explicitly
addresses the issue of organisations and insti-
tutions. However, Regime Theory refers to sec-
toral issues, and does not really constitute a
comprehensive approach. Furthermore, it
remains very state-centric. Finally, all four gov-
ernance theories focus on one policy level with-
out relating it to all other levels.
Global governance:
money and power
The main players involved in collective problem-
solving at the global level are governments,
international and multilateral institutions, TNCs,
and some NGOs. They deal with such issues as
development, trade (liberalisation and
re-regulation), and security. 
The past fifty years have been charac-
terised by the expansion of internation-
al institutions and public players, carry-
ing out international policies, some of
which are self-attributed. They include
the United Nations system with its var-
ious agencies, the Bretton Woods insti-
tutions, i.e., the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, and the
General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs, leading in 1995 to the creation
of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO). All three types of institutions
developed in parallel over the past 50
years, sometimes with overlapping
missions and activities. While the
United Nations, with its multiple agen-
cies, has become more and more frag-
mented and thinly spread (which
became particularly problematic when
funds got scarce), the Bretton Woods
institutions, especially the World Bank,
have invaded UN development territory
by subsuming social development and
sustainability into their economic devel-
opment agenda. The GATT, on the
other hand, developed a powerful
dynamic of trade liberalisation, and by
doing so, somewhat undermined the
agendas of both the UN and the
Bretton Woods institutions. 
Today, in the era of economic, ecologi-
cal, cultural, and technological globali-
sation, with their emerging problems,
paralleled by the growing importance of
TNCs and NGOs, these international
public players have largely redefined
themselves and regrouped around
three key issues: security, sustainable
development and trade regulation. 
The UN, under heavy financial pres-
sure, is currently refocusing on issues
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of security, the safeguard of international boundaries, human
rights protection, and humanitarian intervention. In doing so,
the UN is abandoning one of its core mandates, development
– this is being taken over by the Bretton Woods institutions,
especially, the World Bank, which is in a more favourable
financial position and is sensitive to public opinion. Indeed,
the World Bank, UNDP (the UN Development Programme),
and UNEP (the UN Environment Programme), already linked
through the GEF (Global Environmental Facility), seem to be
regrouping around the issue of sustainable development, and
this might well lead up to a new ‘Earth Bank’. Finally, there is
the issue of trade and trade regulation. Having actively pro-
moted trade liberalisation, the GATT and the WTO now
increasingly come under pressure from public opinion, devel-
oping countries, and TNCs, asking for the reintroduction of
some sort of trade regulation. In order to do this, however, the
WTO will have to regroup with organisations such as ISO (the
International Standardisation Organisation), and other private
players. This illustrates that, at the global level, the definition
of future governance mechanisms is driven by financial and
economic interests as well as corresponding power, mainly of
TNCs. As a result, privately defined standards are likely to
become perfectly acceptable tools for global trade regulation.
The environment, as a cross-cutting issue, relates to all three
dimensions – security, sustainable development and trade
regulation. Indeed, environmental degradation has become
an issue of security. Examples are found in the potential con-
flicts arising from scarcity of natural resources (such as
water), or from transnational environmental damage (such as
nuclear disasters). Secondly, since UNCED, environmental
protection has been reframed in terms of ‘sustainable devel-
opment’, and UN bodies, such as the UNDP and the World
Bank, have been keen to promote corresponding (sustain-
able) development projects. The environment also pertains to
trade: while environmental protection was and still is consid-
ered to be an impediment to trade, it is also becoming an
argument, or perhaps an excuse, for re-regulating trade.
National governance:
managing networks
It is of course at the national level where governments still
have the strongest hold on public affairs. Nevertheless, even
there one can observe the erosion of traditional politics, both
in terms of the policy process (policy-formulation, policy
implementation, and compliance) and in terms
of public management where more and more
stakeholders are involved. In parallel, one can
observe how new types of policies – i.e., facili -
tating, enabling, incentive-based, etc. – are
made necessary since traditional ‘command
and control’ policies are no longer effective. As
a result, various stakeholders – e.g. business-
es and NGOs – are being included both in the
definition of the (environmental) policies and
their implementation. 
This is not (yet) comparable to the situation at
the global level, where governments are clearly
only one among many players involved in man-
aging public affairs. In this respect, the term
governance at the national level is not entirely
appropriate. Governments retain their ultimate
power, i.e., sovereignty over their territory, as
well as control over legislation. Nevertheless,
the capacity to get things done is increasingly
dependent upon a government’s ability to
mobilise the various players involved.
None of the above governance theories
addresses this issue at the national level. One
has to look at theories of public management to
find a conceptualisation of this development. If
the public service in question can be delivered
for the most part by the market, there is a clear
trend from public service provision to regulation.
Where this is not the case, i.e., when public ser-
vice is mainly the result of public provision, one
can identify new theoretical conceptualisations
such as “network management”. Here the role of
government is to mobilise and facilitate a com-
plex network of public, private, and not-for-profit
players. Unfortunately, such conceptualisations
are never fed into the larger framework of gov-
ernance, nor related to developments occurring
above and below the nation-state level.
Local governance
At the local level, governance is a totally differ-
ent matter. In the era of globalisation, the local
becomes synonymous with exploitation
and domination, where it is used by the
global to further the process of globali-
sation. The local is where problems
first become visible – even if they are
only symptoms of global problems –
and where they need to be solved as
they arise, but it is also where the
resources and means to address such
problems are scarcest. If these prob-
lems become too overwhelming,
national and global players intervene.
In non-crisis situations, national politics
generally defines the local as the level
at which all global, regional and nation-
al policies will ultimately (have to) be
implemented. It is also the level which
gives legitimacy to the entire public pol-
icy chain. Many collective issues may
be handled more efficiently at the local
level as populations often have inti-
mate knowledge and experience of
local ecosystems, as well as a sense of
continuity with a given place.
This level of governance has only been
recognised in the context of larger
global problems, in particular after the
publication of the Brundtand Report in
1987. The need for and the role of local
actions has been enhanced by Agenda
21, agreed to at UNCED, and which led
to a spate of local initiatives throughout
the world. Such local initiatives, howev-
er, are rarely self-contained local gov-
ernance mechanisms, as they are part
of a larger concept of implementing a
‘global public policy’. 
True local governance is something
else, namely community-based local
problem-solving within the larger
framework of globalisation and locali-
sation as outlined above, and of ‘learn-
ing our way out’ of the dead end of
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industrial civilisation (e.g., Finger & Asún, forthcoming). Such
collective problem-solving efforts will become increasingly
necessary parallel to the process of globalisation and the
destructive effects it has on local communities and their
livelihoods. They are also quite different from the efforts con-
ceptualised by Common Property Resources Management
Theory. Indeed, the weakness of that theory lies in the fact
that it does not contextualise common property resources
management, particularly within the larger framework of glob-
alisation, although this is where the most innovative gover-
nance efforts take place.
Governance efforts as I have defined them above, can be
seen as attempts to solve (public) problems collectively by
identifying the relevant stakeholders – and can be identified
at global, national, and local levels. Even though the stakes,
and often the players involved are different at each of the
three levels of governance, the levels are not independent
from another, but nor are they at all co-ordinated.
This is particularly problematic in the case of the four theories
discussed above, which all focus on their specific levels.
Global Governance Theory maintains the illusion that gover-
nance can be an encompassing concept linking the local, the
national, and the global into one coherent governance frame-
work. As such, Global Governance Theory – along with
Common Property Resources Management Theory – leads
one to believe that all the players involved in a given gover-
nance mechanism are equal partners, deciding about their
common fate and/or the use of their resources. In this
respect, all four governance theories are particularly perni-
cious: they hide power relationships and the players’ strate-
gic interests. This is particularly problematic at the global
level. 
Global players now have a significant advantage over local
and even national players, as they are more mobile and often
richer. As a result, they exploit the local, particularly the local
resources and manpower, by playing them against each
other. Increasingly, the global players, mainly the TNCs, also
exploit nation-states, or nation-states are simply instrumen-
talised in order to better exploit the local. If the national can-
not be instrumentalised by the global players – say for exam-
ple by the multilateral institutions – it is simply bypassed, as
in the case of the World Bank which works directly with north-
ern and southern NGOs when it comes to implementing
some of its objectives.
A comprehensive
approach to governance
It is doubtful whether any of these three levels is
the appropriate one when it comes to dealing
with globalisation and its negative conse-
quences: indeed the global level is too interest-
ed and involved in pursuing the process for it to
be an appropriate level to address it. The
nation-state, in turn, is either already too instru-
mentalised by the global actors or simply not the
appropriate level when it comes to addressing
the main problems caused by globalisation,
such as the cultural and the ecological conse-
quences of globalisation, in particular, but prob-
ably also the economic problems. The local
level, in turn, even though the most innovative
one, is probably too small and too vulnerable to
national and global forces.
One therefore has to think of other levels of gov-
ernance when it comes to addressing the nega-
tive consequences of the globalisation process.
Key requirements for such levels to be relevant
pertain, in my view, to some sort of ecological
integrity or coherence (e.g., bio-regionalism,
eco-regions, watersheds, etc.), but also to some
sort of cultural dimension. The main stake in the
age of globalisation, pertains to ecological and
cultural survival. Despite the wealth of literature
on eco-regions, the cultural aspect still has to be
clarified. Nevertheless, both the ecological and
the cultural dimensions point to a regional
approach to governance, which, depending on
the country and the region, can either be of
supra- or of sub-national nature. There is yet
another advantage to defining governance at
such a regional level, as most of the gover-
nance mechanisms can still be designed, as
opposed to having to be reclaimed. The original
strategy of the ‘new politics’ thus would precise-
ly be in the design of such new regional gover-
nance mechanisms. 
In the design of such regional governance
mechanisms, one could certainly be inspired by
Regime Theory, as well as by Common
this conceptualisation would have to
occur within the larger context of the
globalisation-localisation dynamics,
taking into account the respective pow-
ers and strategic interests of the vari-
ous global and national playerrs.
Finally, such a conceptualisation would
have to locate itself within the overall
framework of collective problem-solv-
ing or ‘learning our way out’ (Finger &
Asún, forthcoming), the main issue
being the level at which such collective
problem-solving makes most sense
and has most autonomy.
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In a much-cited article, Huntington (1993, p. 39) stated,
“through the IMF and other international economic insti-
tutions, the West promotes its economic interests and
imposes on other nations, the economic policies it
thinks appropriate.” Such statements are enough to make
even the most level-headed of Third World thinkers paranoid.
Why would industrialised countries want to enforce structural
adjustment (SA) policies on poor countries? The worst possi-
ble motive is that for various economic reasons they want to
see poor countries shaped in their own image. The best
motive is that they are persuaded that SA is in the interest of
the economies they lend to. We do not assume an a priori
position on this issue for Pakistan and rely instead on the evi-
dence. 
However, looking at the evidence is not as straightforward as
it sounds since there can be different perspectives from
which it is viewed. As prudent bankers, the IMF and the
World Bank worry about repayments, and so they naturally
adopt a lender’s perspective. Nevertheless, lenders and bor-
rowers may have conflicting interests and so it is important to
assess SA from a national perspective too. Furthermore,
since SA policies vary in their impact on different social
groups, it is important to delve deeper and identify who gains
and who loses, and in what way, from such policies. We refer
to the latter as a political economic perspective. 
Much of the evidence cited in the context of SA has been of
a cross-country nature. Country case studies, however, have
now become more readily available. To date, the evidence
has not conclusively demonstrated that countries that have
tried to reform their economies according to IMF/World Bank-
prompted SA prescriptions (in exchange for loans) have suc-
ceeded in the judgement of either the donors or the borrow-
ers. There are some success stories and many failures. 
Establishing success empirically is difficult, since control data
are often needed but not available, i.e. what would have been
the condition of the country without SA? Even when enough
time has passed to assess reforms, it is difficult to isolate the
impact of structural reforms from everything else going on in
the economy. Failures sometimes stare one in the face in the
form of riots that have often followed SA programmes in the
Third World.
Even so, SA and the neo-liberal paradigm that underlies it
are now the dominant economics paradigms practised by
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developing countries and have been so since
the early 1980s. The reasons for this probably
include the endorsement of such economic
reforms by the G-7 governments and hence its
propagation by the IMF, the World Bank, as well
as many western bilateral aid agencies such as
the USAID. There is also predominant support
for such a reform programme in academia as
well as in prominent advisory or consulting bod-
ies. 
In this essay, we first review the evidence for
Pakistan. Following this, we identify some new
developments in the application of SA in
Pakistan that suggest that SA policies are likely
to have a much more far-reaching impact on
developing countries than in the past. We con-
clude with some advocacy positions.
Evidence from Pakistan1
On most critical economic issues, SA-initiated
reforms embody an internally consistent set of
hypotheses. We began by reporting on evi-
dence generated by testing various neo-liberal
hypotheses on various critical economic issues
such as devaluation, financial sector reform, pri-
vatisation, trade policy and industrialisation.
Following that, we reported on evidence based
on the overall impact of SA on labour and the
poor as well as the impact of gender, health,
environment and food security. While we adopt-
ed a national and a political economic perspec-
tive when assessing SA reforms, we were com-
pletely open to accepting whatever results
emerged. We summarise now the major find-
ings reported in detail in Khan (1999).
Testing hypotheses
We began our research by examining the terms
on which Pakistan receives aid and the impact
of aid and debt on economic growth. There is lit-
tle that is encouraging to be said about how the
terms on which Pakistan receives aid have
changed over time. Concessional aid as a per-
centage of the total has declined, the average
interest rate has increased, the maturity period
has decreased and the grant element
has decreased. Thus Pakistan’s debt in
absolute real terms, the debt/GDP ratio
and the debt/export ratio has
increased, particularly since 1988,
when the more intensive phase of the
SA period started. Given the changing
terms under which Pakistan is receiv-
ing aid, there is every likelihood that the
debt/GDP ratio will continue to rise.
This is particularly the case since our
research shows that aid has a negative
causal impact on GDP (Granger) and
that aid has a negative and significant
impact on economic growth. The latter
finding holds up when subjected to a
test for robustness after controlling for
supply side shocks. There are various
reasons likely to explain the negative
aid-growth association. Among them,
the most prominent are likely to be that
it provides a soft budget constraint as
explained by Kornoi (1986) in the con-
text of the Soviet Bloc, and that it
enables rent-seeking and inefficient
government to survive, as explained in
the public choice literature.
The impact of devaluation was investi-
gated. This is frequently recommended
as part of SA programmes, on the bal-
ance of trade. Estimating export and
import demand functions is the conven-
tional method of evaluating the likely
effect of devaluation on the external
balance. Using quarterly data, we
showed little or no positive effect on the
external balance resulting from a cur-
rency devaluation.
We explored the neo-liberal case for
financial liberalisation. This is premised
on a positive association of real and
financial saving, productivity and
growth with the real term deposit rate.
Some researchers in Pakistan, which
embarked on a series of financial sec-
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tor reforms including interest rate liberalisation, have pre-
sented such evidence. On the one hand, using appropriate
time series analysis, we re-examined the evidence, and
found mild support at best for the neo-liberal hypotheses. On
the other hand, we made a case on political economic
grounds for avoiding or postponing interest rate liberalisation.
In brief, the rich are the real beneficiaries of higher interest
rates. The poor lose from the inflation resulting from the high-
er deficit financing that is resulting from the huge debt
induced by the interest rate liberalisation. Since the rich
refuse to pay their share in taxes, keeping the interest rate
low is a sensible implicit tax on them.
We found support for privatisation of commercial banks,
based on efficiency gains post privatisation and also based
on the better performance of privatised banks compared to
the nationalised banks. We also compared the pre- and post-
privatisation experience of five firms in three industries in
which employee buy-outs and conventional privatisation
occurred. We did not find evidence to support the hypothesis
that labour productivity is higher in employee-owned firms.
We found that private sector firms were more successful than
employee buy-outs in raising profit rates. In general, private
ownership seems to lead to less labour retrenchment,
although in one case the complete replacement of the labour
force lends credence to employee concerns about privatisa-
tion.
We explored whether trade liberalisation has ushered in the
large-scale de-industrialisation that is feared by some to fol -
low in its wake, and whether it has been successful in
enhancing export promotion. We relied on several different
methods and found that the evidence, with regards to indus-
trial and export growth in the SA period, is mixed. The per-
formance of the consumer goods sector in promoting exports
and displacing imports has been robust. Other evidence also
points to an improvement in export performance, although
Pakistan is still not meeting its export potential or matching
the mean performance of even low-income countries.
However, there is evidence of imports displacing domestic
production in the intermediate goods sector, average annual
growth in industry declining, and industry growth falling fur-
ther behind potential in the period of economic liberalisation
compared to the earlier periods. We were not able to estab-
lish, possibly because of the paucity of time-series observa-
tions, that either industry or exports generated positive exter-
nalities for, or used resources more productive-
ly than, the rest of the economy.
Assessing impacts
We reviewed evidence regarding the likely
impact of IMF/World Bank policies on labour
and the poor in Pakistan. Our findings show that
since the 1988 bout of SA, public sector
employment has decreased while wages have
been frozen. Also, overall unemployment in
occupations with a high incidence of the poor
has dramatically increased and real wages of
skilled and unskilled labour sharply declined. In
addition, subsidies that were critical to the con-
sumption pattern of the poor have been cut,
while the burden of indirect taxes on the poorest
income group has increased. Not surprisingly,
there has been an increase in poverty and
inequality, particularly in the rural areas. 
We reviewed the change in the socio-economic
condition of women during the intensive period
of SA in their role as producers, as home man-
agers and as mothers. In their role as produc-
ers, overall participation of female labour
increased such that their share in the labour
force virtually tripled. However, over this period,
there was a dramatic decline in female self-
employment and a more dramatic rise in the
female unemployment. In their role as home
managers, women confronted a more than dou-
bling of the sensitive price index and a cut of
about two-thirds in consumption subsidies, as a
percent of the budget. The price of wheat, from
which the poor derive about 55 percent of their
calorific intake and about 70 percent of their
protein intake, also more than doubled. The
numbers show that compared to 1987-88, edu-
cation expenditure as a percent of GNP has
been constant, while that of health has actually
declined. This could have had an adverse
impact on women in their role as mothers.
While government health expenditures as a per-
centage of GNP have declined in Pakistan, in
absolute real terms it has increased. Progress
over this period is evident on a number of health
indicators such as the infant, child and
maternal mortality rates as well as life
expectancy. However, Pakistan still
lags far behind the means of low-
income countries and South Asian
countries in all child survival statistics.
In view of this, and since the evidence
shows a significant and sizeable asso-
ciation of public sector health expendi-
tures and the decline in infant mortality
rates, there seems little justification in
cutting public sector health expendi-
tures.
We surveyed issues on trade and the
environment from a southern perspec-
tive and with a focus on the available
evidence. There is reason to believe,
and a little evidence confirming, that
manufacturing export promotion would
result in the use of cleaner technolo-
gies than producing for a protected
domestic market. Evidence suggests
that primary export promotion may be
environmentally detrimental. Much less
has been written about the environ-
mental impact of import liberalisation
that is required to accompany export
promotion. There is a danger that
unregulated import liberalisation may
result in the dumping of dirty, second-
hand, northern machinery and haz-
ardous agricultural inputs. We focused
on the agriculture sector and showed
that Pakistan is pursuing a very open
regime with regards to the import of
pesticides and fertilisers. We conduct-
ed a suggestive cost-benefit exercise
to highlight potential environmental
costs and the relevant policy issues.
We explored issues of food security,
entitlement and resulting capabilities
on an aggregate level. The positive
finding is that even though the area
being devoted to cash crops is rising
much more rapidly than the area devot-
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ed to food crops, the increase in food production is keeping
pace with the increase in cash crop production. This appears
to have translated into a steady increase in per capita avail-
ability in the important food crops and also in an average
increase in calorific and protein intake for all income groups.
However, we find that capabilities of the poor have been
eroded over the SA period with real wages falling sharply,
inflation in food prices exceeding non-food prices, unemploy-
ment rising, and average household income falling. We also
explain how privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation in
the agricultural sector may make coping more difficult for the
small farmer.
New trends in structural
adjustment policies 
Several new trends in SA policies seem evident from observ-
ing the recent engagements of the Government of Pakistan
with the Bretton Woods institutions.
Pre-conditionalities
The Government is being required to show good perfor-
mance before the next tranche is released. Thus instead of
conditionalities to be satisfied once the loan is released,
Pakistan is being required to satisfy pre-conditionalities in
order to get the loan. 
Overt politicisation
Political criteria might always have determined whether or not
SA loans would be granted to governments. Thus while a
charade of meeting performance criteria was maintained, the
G-7 had other criteria in mind when calling the shots.
However, of late, it seems that the charade has been aban-
doned. Pakistan had a good dose of reality when it toyed with
an independent military posture in Kashmir. In fact, not only
did the Pakistani Prime Minister make a hasty trip to
Washington, D. C. to reassure the US President, but historic
realities were abandoned and the disputed territory of
Kashmir was referred to as Indian territory. A high price, in
the form of Kashmiri aspirations for self-determination, was
paid for the restoration of the SA facility and the green light to
foreign investment and other bilateral and multi-lateral aid. 
Overt support for international capital
Once again, a radical view holds that SA
market-friendly policies are designed to facilitate the opera-
tions of multinational corporations. Recent
experience in Pakistan shows that if ever there
were a pretence that this was not the case, it
has been abandoned. The World Bank facilitat-
ed the deal between multi-national power pro-
ducers, referred to as independent power pro-
ducers or IPPs, and the Government of
Pakistan. It also provided guarantees and
directly extended a loan facility for it.2 The deals
went sour when a new government came to
power and alleged that kickbacks were respon-
sible for the old government agreeing to non-
viable, high tariffs and guarantees of govern-
ment purchase. The Bretton Woods institutions
have now made it clear to the government that
the next tranche of the current SA loan will
depend on the resolution of the IPP issue.3
While the Government has gained political
mileage from the issue by maligning the out-
going government, there is a genuine concern
that buying power at the contracted tariff will
bankrupt the country’s main power utility.
The stakes for the Government are now very
high. Its official reserves stand at only about
$1,474 billion. However, the bottom line may not
be the IPP issue, but whether or not Pakistan
will agree to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) as the G-7 would like. While
there are many good reasons to sign the CTBT,
or to have avoided the nuclear option, it is
shameful to be susceptible to such pressure.
IMF/ World Bank as whipping boys
A recent advertisement placed by the IMF for a
public relations officer suggests that the Fund is
concerned about its image. However, the
impression created by observing the political-
economic scene in Pakistan appears to be that
the Bretton Woods institutions are quite content
to take the fall. Thus the Government routinely
passes the buck for harsh decisions such as the
imposition of a regressive generalised sales tax
or increases in utility prices on to the
Fund/Bank. Not only that, this drama also
allows the Government to keep postponing diffi-
cult decisions, engaging in real structural reform
such as land reform, imposing an agri-
cultural income tax and other direct
taxes, and dealing with weak tax and
financial administration. Instead it con-
tinues to engage in large schemes
which have no social cost-benefit or
environmental impact assessments
and much kick-back potential, such as
the yellow-taxi scheme, the motor-way
construction scheme and the ‘my-
house’ construction scheme.
Conclusion
The truth is that the Bretton Woods
institutions often get it wrong. Despite
an economic slow-down, Pakistan is
being asked to meet a deficit target of
3.3 percent of GNP. The insistence on
interest rate liberalisation has resulted
in a huge domestic debt due to the
higher costs of government borrowing.
Ironically the interest payments on this
debt are an important cause of the
deficit in the first place. Similarly, their
insistence on premature trade liberali-
sation has shrunk the tax revenue
(again leading to a deficit) and generat-
ed de-industrialisation (again causing
the tax base to shrink). The insistence
on exchange rate liberalisation had vir-
tually no impact on the trade deficit, but
increased the foreign debt in local cur-
rency terms to the extent that prices did
not adjust or adjusted slowly. When
prices do adjust, the poor once again
suffer from the erosion of their standard
of living. 
The incompatibility of inflation with
exchange rate liberalisation, of trade
deficit with trade liberalisation, and of
deficits with interest rate liberalisation,
and so on, are also examples of the
Bretton Woods institutions getting it
wrong. Thus, many of the problems
such as inflation, large deficits and
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unemployment that SA is supposed to deal with have often
resulted from these policies. The doctor creates an unending
demand for his services! 
In all fairness, the World Bank genuinely seems as though it
wishes to learn from its mistakes. Its current approach to
large dams, and its support for clean fuels, the environment
and gender sensitivity suggests hope. Yet, even its own
reports show that its large projects, such as the Environment
Protection and Resource Conservation Project often perform
poorly. The staff and consultants who fly in for short visits
have a limited understanding of the institutional culture and
what is possible. Also, for the most part it seems that the
same core market ideology drives the Bank prescriptions as
in the case of the Fund.4
What are the solutions to this problem of SA that is present-
ed to poor countries as a solution? First, if aid must be taken,
then, as the State Government in Calcutta recently stated,
the lenders need concern themselves only with repayment
and, if there are doubts about that, the loan need not be
given. 
Second, given the evidence pointing to a negative associa-
tion between aid and economic growth, there is a case to
press governments to stop taking destructive aid as suggest-
ed by the ‘50 years is enough’ campaign. Malaysia has
demonstrated that its approach to dealing with the recent
Asian crisis of imposing capital controls and avoiding defla-
tion resulted in a much lower human cost than that in
Thailand and Indonesia, and it also avoided indebting future
generations by refusing to go to the IMF.
Thirdly, the ‘50 year is enough’ campaign now needs to be
carried further. The real problem is that poor countries have
no redress for the expensive mistakes made by the Bretton
Woods Institutions. It is now time for scholars to gather evi -
dence systematically. Countries, organisations or individuals
should take the Bretton Woods institutions to court for dam-
ages to current and future generations. Perhaps the threat of
such liability will encourage responsible behaviour. While it is
true that the “piper calls the tune,” and that the governments
of poor countries need not take the loans, the reality is that
rapacious elites solicit the loans for their own benefit. Thus
the poor in southern countries need protection. An alliance of
enlightened liberals in the South and the North for legal
action may help.
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Footnotes
1 This evidence has been drawn from Khan (1999).
2 “Hectic government efforts to deal with HUBCO crisis,” The
News International (Islamabad), September 25, 1999, p. 1.
3 The World Bank President, James Wolfensohn, is claimed
to have said that Pakistan needed to resolve the remaining
issues with the IPPs to win more money from the IMF and the
World Bank. Similarly, the Managing Director of the IMF,
Michael Camdessus, is said to have mentioned that the delay
in the $280 million tranche has to do with difficulties in meet-
ing conditions starting with the IPP issue. “IMF says tranche
delayed to Pakistan,” The News International (Islamabad),
September 25, 1999, p. 1.
4 For now it seems that the top leadership in the Bank has dif-
ferences with the unthinking application of these prescriptions
as indicated by a surprising essay titled “Sick patients, warring
doctors,” in September 18th-24th, 1999 issue of  The
Economist
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Hijacking is a metaphor about agency and action, inten-
tion and implication. How useful is it as a description and
an explanation of political behaviour in South Asia?
Kidnapping and hijacking
Social scientists and policy makers too often equate the sum
of institutional behaviour with the operation of the State; the
process of building states with the creation of specific institu-
tions; and stability with maintenance. Conversely, the break-
down of institutions is often thought to indicate the necessary,
potential or possible implosion of the State itself. These
equations are incomplete and often misleading. The State’s
relationships to political, economic, and civil societies are at
least as important as its technical capacities in several ways.
Firstly, the instruments that craft these relationships are
embedded in the ideologies that create and maintain the
State. Secondly, state implosion can most often be located in
the breaches between state and society. Thirdly, governance
breaks down when the ideology that organises power disal-
lows appropriate and adequate relations between citizen and
state – when those who govern pursue politics that not only
diminish the reach of state institutions, but also its nature –
by removing the expression of demands from the ways that
needs are addressed.
Kidnapping is a simple version of this breach. When one part
of the State overtakes another, bargains are generally struck
among various interest groups and affected parties to return
the institution to its portfolio. This is a form of ransom, paid by
affected parties to those who have transgressed norms.
Ransom changes relationships, and in the end, the question
of propriety – should it have been paid, was the cost correct?
– is left for future judgement.
Kidnapping embodies several intra-mural activities: when the
power balance within the State is destroyed by some, others
extend the rules of politics and in so doing, appear to act
rationally. The result is almost inevitably an incremental dis-
tortion of the system that gradually changes the system itself,
and can reinforce characteristics that lead to breakdown.
Recent decades in South Asia offer many examples of this
problem: the misuse of elections by parliamentary minorities
and majorities alike, the use of force to reduce the power of
judicial institutions, and the coup d’état are all versions of this
phenomenon.
Hijacking is more complex. Customary lan-
guage suggests that someone or something
outside the system overtakes the entire system.
But who hijacks whom, and how?
Under circumstances of invasion, for example,
actors who do not normally work within the
State take over that State, although state actors
may be complicit in hijacking. The result may be
a new version of the old State, or a new State
entirely. 
Two extreme versions of hijacking seem to
describe the State kidnapping itself: revolution
from within, and in a very different way, state
failure. Both involve domestic actors who take
on roles outside the basic structure of the State
– that is, acting on terms different from those on
which the State is constituted, and in ways that
remove the State from those who had com-
prised it. This sense of hijacking is intrinsically
revolutionary in spirit – the content of ideology
notwithstanding – although its immediate
results may seem more like workaday reform.
Hijacking cannot be judged solely on the basis
of perceived changes in policy; rather, it is iden-
tified by the way in which changes in basic
structure are effected.
Agency is therefore joined with the intention to
subvert. When institutional behaviour simply
describes the erosion of institutional mandates
or revisions in the terms of authority – often
undertaken precisely to maintain the status quo
– this is not hijacking. Instead, hijacking
describes actions that are meant to invoke
change in the nature of the State by subversion.
When subversion occurs, how do state actors
respond? Under normal circumstances, institu-
tional actors choose among a range of alterna-
tive behaviours: they might resist the imposition
of change, or succumb to pressures to legitimate
changes in basic structure. More often, they val-
idate changes incrementally, under conditions of
uncertainty – hence the jurisprudence of revolu-
tionary legality in Pakistan, or recasting military
ordinances into constitutional amend-
ments in a variety of martial law states. 
The slippery slope from validation to
legitimisation reflects a dangerous ana-
lytical problem as well as a practical
political one. Can institutions legitimise
the change that hijacking implies? If
elected government alters the constitu-
tional structure of the State, and thus
the terms within which authority is con-
stituted, is this hijacking? If so, is it
because of specific changes, or the
ways in which they are made? Who (or
what) is required to legitimise hijack-
ing?
Each of these questions raises the
spectre of state failure: the most impor-
tant element of the concept is its totali-
ty. When revolution occurs, the State
as an entity may not appear to be in
danger, but the particular State as a
political concept is jeopardised.
Similarly, invasion may threaten the
physical integrity of the State and the
safety of its people, but more profound
are the different political meanings that
the State takes on for its citizens and
outside interlocutors alike. In both
cases, hijacking is essentially a political
concept, the nature of which is defined
simultaneously from within and without.
By their very natures, the concepts of
hijacking and state failure are commen-
taries on the changing nature of state
sovereignty.
Two examples exhibit the complexity
that hijacking raises. 
• Hijacking a failed state.
Afghanistan is a state whose territo-
rial sovereignty has been jeopar-
dised by armed conflict, and which
has no functioning institutions.
Under these conditions, if the
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Taliban movement were to appropriate state institutions
fully, its efforts would be labelled kidnapping, and possibly
hijacking. Without active domestic contest, the role of for-
eign interlocutors is critical in relation to fighting factions.
Here hijacking is a transnational activity made possible by
state failure. Because no-one in Afghanistan is yet capa-
ble of withstanding the ideological pressures imposed by
fighting, the State is, in effect, twice hijacked. 
• Not quite hijacking a failing state. Prior to the October
1999 coup d’état , Pakistan’s institutions functioned, but
only through the constant onslaught of political pressures
that increasingly come from outside formal politics. The
major responsibilities of the State were rarely undertaken
by state institutions. Power-holders deliberately ceded
responsibilities to new political organisations whose self-
defined dual roles were to take over institutions and reject
their ideological underpinnings: private armies threatened
the State’s monopoly of force, judiciaries were silenced by
political appropriation, and parliaments were forced not to
function. The weight of evidence suggests that the State
was undergoing significant revision – and the coup d’état
was a predictable outcome of the strife that such contest
caused. Under such circumstances, neither state institu-
tions nor constitutional instruments seem relevant. Do
such changes in the terms of political sovereignty consti -
tute hijacking? Does hijacking precede state failure, or are
they concurrent?
In each instance, the writ of the State is redefined and the
nature of risk – for the State and its future – is redefined as
well. The totality of the hijacking phenomenon underscores
the close identity of institutions with one another, and the
ways that authority – regardless of the constitutional mandate
of institutions – is often indivisible. Moreover, if hijacking is a
process, and not a discrete event, saving the State is an
equally – if not more – complicated process. Here metaphor
elides into literalism: how is the ship of state to be recovered?
Conceptual queries
• When is the hijacking of institutions equivalent to state fail -
ure; when does it precede state failure; and when is it a
phenomenon separate from state failure? 
• Is hijacking a discrete event, the accumulation of events,
an autonomous or semi-autonomous process, or simply
tion or result, means or ends? (Is Pakistan
failing because it has been, in effect,
hijacked?)
• If state behaviour does not change, when can
we say that it has been hijacked? (Has the
Taliban hijacked Afghanistan; did that happen
before it arrived; or is this an event — or pro-
cess — waiting to happen?)
• Is institutional hijacking always synonymous
with ideological hijacking? 
• If hijacking and state failure are not synony-
mous, which institutions and/or instruments
can prevent hijacking from becoming state
failure, and how? What are the necessary
conditions for establishing and/or retaining
the resilience of institutions? (Is the military
more important in the calculus than, for exam-
ple, courts?)
• Has a state failed when state institutions do
not work appropriately, but non-state institu-
tions continue to function? To what degree is
the vitality of the non-state sector an indicator
of state resilience? (How do we compare ele-
ments of the non-state sector – non-govern-
mental organisations, private armies, and
mosques and temples, for example?) 
• When does active resistance to the State sig-
nify the breakdown of institutions, when does
it suggest that the basic structure of the State
is compromised, and when does it signify the
continuing resilience of the State? Is the
absence of resistance an important reflection
of hijacking or kidnapping?
• How can a hijacked state be retrieved? How
important are external players in this calcu-
lus? What, if any, instruments of the State are
needed to engage in the process of retrieval?
Instrumental queries
Several examples in the recent history of South
Asia extend the boundaries of our thinking about
Institutional incompatibility and
conflicting political agendas
During Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s
second term, the Supreme Court Chief
Justice came into conflict with Govern-
ment in ways that risked the integrity of
the court, constitutional limits on parlia-
mentary rule and prospects for demo-
cratic governance. A stand-off about
issues of judicial administration
required the arbitration of the Army
Chief, and ended in the resignation of
the Chief Justice. During judicial chal-
lenges to the parliamentary writ, mem-
bers of the Cabinet stormed the Court.
Despite evidence to the contrary, a
later Supreme Court decision ruled that
the storming had not taken place.
Declining civil liberties protections, the
abuse of rights for ethnic minorities,
sectarian assassinations, and major
chasms between elected and appoint-
ed bodies challenged the constitutional
foundation of the State to the point that
its ideological and institutional fabric
risked implosion.
In these instances, the basis for politi-
cal legitimacy is contested, not through
institutions, but via attacks on institu-
tions. At what point is the State no
longer what it once was? How can we
parse the notion of political agency to
understand whether the State has
been hijacked by those who purport to
represent it? Is the coup d’état a mode




The classic case of hijacking is the
cancellation of constitutional rule. Each
of Pakistan’s coups d’état was followed
by the imposition of a provisional con-
stitutional order that placed the consti-
tution out of the reach of institutions
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ciary to comply with constitutional cancellation through intim-
idation, or the promise of restoration. Restoration, in turn
(although time will tell with the 1999 coup), became part of the
redesign of the ideological wrapping of the State which, in
turn, altered the balance among institutions in ways that
made real democracy difficult to attain. After the 1977 coup
and the 1985 partial restoration, the structure of institutions –
from the rule of law to the previously respected delineation
between foreign and domestic politics – was jeopardised to
the point that the State risked failure from the forces set in
motion by the military government.
A slightly different version of this intention was played out in
both Pakistan and Bangladesh through their respective 8th
constitutional amendments, written by military governments
as a lure to parliaments interested in reviving constitutional
rule. Both attempted a dual goal: to revise state ideology and
to redraw judicial responsibilities to support the new ideology.
Both were really military ordinances disguised as parliamen-
tary prerogatives. 
In both instances, institutions were kidnapped by those in
power: the masquerade of disjointed incrementalism led
politicians and courts alike to act as if they were not fettered.
This was not really true: neither state, however, is what it once
was. The jurisprudence used to justify these manoeuvres,
and the parliamentary acquiescence they demanded, have
plagued the principles and practice of politics in both coun-
tries. Does revoking constitutionalism count as hijacking?
Jurisprudential failures leading to new state formations
Political parties in east Pakistan tried to use state institutions
to further the project of democratic majoritarianism. High
courts falteringly attempted to reconcile centralisation and
devolution, and democratic rhetoric with military rule. Judicial
failure (in a directed state) led to war and secession. One or
another of Pakistan’s wings was hijacked through the failed
symbols of sovereignty. 
Does forced secession constitute hijacking? (Does it matter
which wing, and which leaders, undertook hijacking?) How
are means and ends judged? 
The problematic of parliamentary crisis
Democratic majoritarianism in Pakistan and Bangladesh has
yet to succeed fully. The formal equation of democracy and
elections has been disproved: dissent is not seen as part of
parliamentary democracy, but alternately as the
progenitor or outgrowth of anti-parliamentary
actions – and state institutions suffer as much
as the vaunted concept of democracy. The pro-
cesses of democracy are subordinated to end
products, and the futility of achieving them is co-
ordinately viewed as a characteristic of the polit-
ical system itself. In terms of representation,
legitimacy and policy, the results are predictably
paltry and seemingly intractable. In this sense,
all participants in politics are complicit in the
implosion of the State, the failures of parliamen-
tary rule, and the kidnapping and/or hijacking of
the State. The long-term, pervasive quality of
such behaviour turns kidnapping into hijacking.
The metaphoric and literal dimensions of these
cases give rise to questions about institutions,
political intention and agency. All point to failures
in state structure, and thus, to the potential for
kidnapping and, in some cases, hijacking. A
number of the issues raised – including the orig-
inal weaknesses of state institutions, their rela-
tionships to one another, and significantly,
whether states can adapt to significant change in
citizen preferences (regardless of the source of
these preferences) – also address several ques-
tions that these notes do not: the economic and
social basis for political action, and the ways that
resources are mobilised through policy.
Returning the State to its owners
Once hijacking occurs, several things happen at
once: governance in its broadest sense ceases,
and the residue of state authority becomes eas-
ily appropriable for uses that are generally nei-
ther equitable nor just. When hijacking is equiv-
alent to state failure – or leads to it, or accom-
panies it — the first element of the State to dis-
appear is justice. To recapture the State there-
fore requires establishing a sense of justice as
a defining element of the State, and as a pre-
requisite for rebuilding institutions. This differs
markedly from the improvisations that so often
characterise transitions. Indeed, improvisation
and short-term conciliation rarely offer a vehicle
for recovering the State from its hijackers.
When state institutions fail, or when
they appear to be failing, citizen despair
takes many forms; after a point, few
frustrations seem satisfied by ordinary
impulses to reconstruct institutions.
Resurrecting small traditional mecha-
nisms may offer limited respite from
individual woes, but cannot substitute
for the complex institutions that the
State is designed to provide. The best
justification for reviving the State –
however fraught with problems it
always is – is the project of providing
justice and ensuring rights in the com-
plex ways that complex societies
require.
In this sense, governance – the envi-
ronment for providing justice and the
aggregation of state institutions estab-
lished for that purpose – is both means
and ends. To the degree that institu-
tions themselves are complicit (by
implication, if not intention) in hijacking,
delivering or returning them to a rights
-based notion of justice would seem to
be a prerequisite for reconstituting
and/or repairing the State. In South
Asia’s current circumstances, with
transnational markets and political
forces overtaking many national activi-
ties and loyalities, rescuing the State
from hijacking may be the first step in
recognising the State’s changing role.
This article is an edited version of a
presentation prepared for an
SSRC/IUCN conference on gover-
nance, held in Pakistan in August
1999; and is a short, preparatory ver-
sion of a longer article to be published
by the SSRC.
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Paving flagstones to Hell
Hijacking public resources in the name of development
Extracts from a paper by Dipak Gyawali
It is said that the road to Hell is paved with good inten-
tions. In much of South Asia, wherever one sees pathol-
ogy in the practice of irrigation or any other endeavour
related to water resources, one is often misled in one’s
search for the cause by the purported noble intentions of
bringing ‘development’ to the ignorant masses. 
That the State should be the micro-manager of a nation’s
water resources is a recent event. In South Asia, aided and
abetted either by colonialism or foreign aid, the State has
taken on the divine right to own, manage and modify the nat-
ural resources within its area of jurisdiction. For instance,
Nepal’s Water Resources Act 1992 has declared for the first
time that water ‘above the ground, on the ground and below
the ground’ belongs to the State. This has happened in a
country with one of the longest and best studied traditions of
‘farmer-managed irrigation systems’ as opposed to state-
managed projects that came into being only towards the end
of Rana reign as a response to British India engaging in sim-
ilar ventures across the border.
This process of devolving resource management to the State
and its bureaucracy benefits the social sector responsible for
conveying the technology in question. For instance, a civil
engineering degree commands a high ‘dowry value’ in the
cow belt of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh because it essentially
gives the holder the licence to dispense with state resources
earmarked for flood protection and embankment construc-
tion. An electrical engineering degree assures the certificate-
holder a job in a state-owned electricity corporation which is
kept afloat through high tariffs and subsidies, a job that has
perks and side earnings that accrue from the rent-seeking
opportunities generated by the State monopoly. The network
that sustains the rent-seeking mechanism often consists of
an iron – politician-contractor-bureaucrat – triangle that
obstructs decision-making (the license raj), public audit and
scrutiny. Such state monopolies justify their existence
through incantations of the welfare motive, but their existence
often serves to sustain a class that is able to divert resources
to its advantage.
The pathology of this form of social parasitism can be illus-
trated by case studies of water management in South Asia.
The case study approach is often criticised for not being com-
prehensive or sufficiently representative. The methods often
used to counter this are statistical surveys that attempt to
capture a representative sample. However, such methods
can be prohibitively expensive and may be used
only if there is a reasonable chance that they
can be pursued fairly. In most cases of develop-
ment pathology, the vested interests are so
entrenched that the application of these mea-
sures is too risky. How, for instance, can one
find the truth when the State structure itself has
been hiding the data, when it has falsified infor-
mation or presented a picture of well-being that
is at variance with the true experience of farm-
ers? It is not in the interest of the iron triangle to
allow such research because it is disturbing to
the status quo. The method chosen in this arti-
cle is to look at case studies where an ‘argu-
mentative’ civil society has brought forth evi-
dence in the face of state opposition, which
highlight how the welfare objectives that osten-
sibly justified projects were subverted to suit
narrow interests.
Sri Lanka1
Southern Sri Lanka is a hydro-ecological region
which enjoyed a sustainable system of irrigation
for seven centuries. This began to decline in the
twelfth century with the introduction of the State-
centric hydraulic engineering perspective,
although this did not become widespread until
the advent of colonialism. Catering to the short-
term goal of hydraulic efficiency, such a system
leads to a rapid extraction of accumulated
resources at the expense of the long-term need
to sustain the productive potential of land and
water.
According to the hydraulic engineering perspec-
tive, water is seen as inanimate but active, and
the small village ponds of the ancient irrigation
systems primitive and inefficient. These need to
be replaced by larger storage reservoirs which
are ostensibly more beneficial on the principle of
economy of scale. Distribution systems are
designed in well-laid grid blocks to supply water
to individual farmers who are seen as individual-
ist entrepreneurs in isolation from both nature
and their peers. Downstream, surrounding land
is levelled to make it amenable to the construc-
tion of large canals. Forests are
cleared to make way for efficient mono-
cropping and may be limited to the
upper catchment area to reduce silting
in the reservoir.
In contrast, the ecosystems perspec-
tive views water as animate and pas-
sive due to its role as facilitator in
nature’s bio-geo-chemical cycles,
especially in the root zones of soils that
‘live’ because of water. Using this sys-
tem, perfected over thousands of
years, farmers are not just Western-
style economic agents of agribusiness,
but part of the whole: the outflow from
one farmer’s field is the input to anoth-
er farmer’s plot in a web that intercon-
nects the whole village. Small ponds
are interconnected (as are villages)
with larger canals and bund structures
that adapt to the contours of the land
as well as to the nature of the rainfall.
Forests are an intrinsic part of this per-
spective and they are interspersed with
fields in development areas for better
conservation of nutrient flows.
While the hydraulic engineering per-
spective is based on the strategy of
domination over nature, the ecosys-
tems perspective is based on strate-
gies that adapt to nature either actively
or passively, depending on the strength
and complexity of the social organisa-
tion. As a top-down, expertise-based
approach, modern irrigation engineer-
ing has relegated the farmer to a pas-
sive role, and failed to see how the vil-
lage tank was the centre of village life
and a major source of security against
the inevitable drought.
The Lunugamvehera and Udawalawe
projects in the south, or the Eppawala
Jayaganga in the northern dry zone tell
of resource manipulation that fails to
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meet the stated objectives (they often fail to provide the water
promised), and in the process alienated the farmers from the
State itself. The burning down of the engineer’s office of the
Lunugamvehera project just after it was ceremoniously inau-
gurated, was the first indication of the dissatisfaction rife in
the area. This was to express itself in a later avtar as the JVP
uprising. The social class responsible for bringing this tech-
nology, however, labelled this an anti-social and anti-govern-
ment act to be counteracted with violence at the State’s
behest, rather than an honest audit of the project and its
claims.
Bihar2
In a similar way to the Bangladesh delta further downstream,
Bihar is the inland meeting ground of several mighty
Himalayan drainage systems such as the Ganga, Gandak,
Kosi and smaller but no less destructive rivers such as the
Mahananda, Kamala and the Bagmati. Bihar, which has half
the area of Poland and more than twice its population, con-
stitutes less than 14% of the overall Ganga basin. The char-
acteristics of these rivers of the Himalaya-Ganga are deter-
mined by the heavy monsoon precipitation between June and
September when the rivers are in a spate. During other
months, the flow is a function of groundwater inflow with
some snowmelt in the spring, if the rivers have snowlines in
their catchment. Unlike rivers in temperate climes such as
Europe or the eastern US, the peak monsoon flows in the
rivers of the Himalaya-Ganga can be a thousand times high-
er than dry season runoff. The implication of this hydro-eco-
logical phenomenon is that hydro-technical control technolo-
gies, which have to be designed for extreme flood events,
need to be many times more expensive here to be effective
than would be the case in Europe.
Another unusual phenomenon arises from the extreme
regimes of the rivers of the Himalaya-Ganga: high sediment
load that erodes one of the youngest mountain chains and
builds the Indo-Gangatic floodplains as well as the Bengal
delta. It is a geologic process of immense scale that is com-
paratively only slightly and locally exacerbated by anthro-
pogenic misdeeds. The implication of this hydro-ecological
phenomenon is that reservoirs in the Himalaya-Ganga have
a life expectancy a half to a quarter of that of such reservoirs
in temperate climes. Correspondingly, the economic invest-
ments made in such technologies become that much costlier.
Furthermore, the technology of embankment
building to contain floodwaters of a river within
demarcated channels also become ineffective
after a very short period. The reason for this is
that, instead of spreading out over the flood
plains, the sediment is deposited within the
embankment and raises the level of the
riverbed. This induces more seepage from the
river at its height into the allegedly protected
area that, compounded with the water already
collected from normal rainfall, remains trapped
outside the embankment. It contributes to what
is known as water logging, where land that
would have been flooded for two to fourteen
days a year remains so for as long as nine
months or more.
It is within the last fifty years of Indian indepen-
dence that the marginalised north Indian State
of Bihar experienced extensive development in
the areas of irrigation and flood control. The ini-
tial promise made during the latter days of
British rule and repeated since Independence,
was of a high dam at Barahakshetra in Nepal
where the Kosi emerges from the hills into the
plains after draining a catchment that ranges
from Kathmandu in the west to Sikkim in the
east. Funding competition within the Indian
Union and the difficulties of negotiations with
Nepal placed that option on the back burner.
The technology chosen instead was that of
embankment construction with an irrigation
component added later to make the scheme
economically more attractive.
During the British Raj, there were serious
doubts about the viability of large-scale surface
irrigation schemes as well as embankments in
the north Ganga plains. After Independence in
1947, such projects were needed to give legiti-
macy to the new state in the eyes of the newly
liberated masses. This method of flood control
and irrigation was selected with missionary
zeal. In examining the history of decision-mak-
ing in this period, one is struck by the institu-
tional filters at work, which, having selected the
technology of embankment building for the mis-
sion at hand, chose to disregard all evi-
dence pointing to the need for caution.
Embankments increased from 154km
in 1954 to 3454 km by 1988. However,
the flood-prone areas increased in this
period from 2.5 million ha to 6.46 mil-
lion ha. The Kosi project, conceived in
1953 to irrigate 712,000 ha in the north
Bihar plains, succeeded in irrigating
only 213,000 ha (1984 figures). On the
other hand, the project has managed to
water-log and expose 292,000 ha of
fertile land to further flooding and trap
800,000 people in 338 villages in a
limbo of poverty and destitution.
The most striking impact of fifty years
of embankment building in Bihar is the
corruption in its administration, as the
following bears out:
Such is the racket of breaches that
out of the 2.5 to 3 billion rupees
spent annually by the Bihar govern-
ment on the construction and repair
works, as much as 60 percent used
to be pocketed by the politician-
contactors-engineers nexus... The
actual expenditure never exceeds
30 percent of the budgeted cost
and after doling out the fixed per-
centages, the contractors are able
to pocket as much as 25 percent of
the sanctioned amount. A part of
this they use to finance the political
activities of their pet politicians and
get further projects sanctioned.
Thus the cycle goes on. 3
The response of the water managers in
India, whether in Delhi or in Patna, has
been to turn a blind eye to this failure.
There have been no attempts by the
State machinery to review the impact of
irrigation and embankments on the pro-
ductivity and human welfare within the
area in question, or to initiate corrective
the State that was the entrepreneur, the auditor
and the adjudicator. No other independent soli-
darity was allowed, which meant that real busi-
ness and real activism were driven under-
ground. It was in the interest of this solidarity to
maintain the terrain uncontested. However, the
ill-effects of runaway technology soon became
manifest in the social polity, and activism
emerged anew.
Had the terrain not been uncontested to start
with, perhaps the voices of cautionary activism
and innovative entrepreneurship would have
provided solutions that may have been less
damaging to the environment and society. The
cases above do demonstrate that uncontested
terrains are hijacked by one set of interests at
the expense of others. Reform would necessi-
tate that space is provided to all interest groups.
Perhaps the difficulty lies in seeing ‘governance’
as synonymous with ‘management’, because
the socio-physical complexity of the Himalaya-
Ganga cannot be micro-managed. The uncer-
tainties are too high, the complexities too intri-
cate, and the potential for surprises all too fre-
quent for ‘management’ to be the goal of good
governance. Such an approach can easily lead
to a hubris of monistic control such as has
occurred with Nehruvian socialism or Stalinist
totalitarianism. A more modest goal would be to
reduce the scale and scope of surprises, which
can be achieved with interventions in nature that
are modest in scale, with decisions regarding
them made as close to the users as possible,
and with ample scope for challenge from the
innovators and those raising voices of caution.
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measures. One possible reason is the entrenched nature of
the corruption, which has contributed to a burgeoning grass-
roots activist counter-reaction. Groups such as the Bihar
Kudal Sena (Bihar Hoe Army), Shaheedi Jatha (Martyr
Squad) and Tatbandh Virodhi Sangharsh Samity (Anti-
Embankment Agitation Committee) are engaged in protest
movements that range from peaceful gheraos to not-so-
peaceful demolition of embankments. Very often, officials and
police are chased away by the locals when they try to repair
the embankments that have been cut or demolished by the
locals.
As with the Sri Lankan case, the water establishment has not
taken the initiative to re-examine the efficacy of its fifty-year
efforts. If questions are asked, they are often procedural,
relating to bureaucratic lapses. Questioning the efficacy of
embankment building would cast doubt on the rationale for
the very existence of the Department of Water Resources. As
a result of this limitation in self-evaluation (which would have
been the basis for self-legitimisation), activist groups such as
the ones mentioned above as well as the Barh Mukti Abhiyan
(Flood Liberation Campaign) have intensified their cam-
paigns to stop or demolish embankment building. The State
machinery, on the other hand, continues to look for a solution
in a high dam in Nepal. The rift in perspectives between
these two social solidarities leaves little room for conflict res-
olution. 
Governing versus Managing
The cases discussed above highlight how public welfare
schemes ended up benefiting a few at the expense of the
public. In Sri Lanka a hydraulic mindset bent on controlling
nature rather than actively adapting to it ended up fostering
schemes that alienated the peasant from the land and ulti -
mately the State. In Bihar, a technology was massively imple-
mented which was ill-suited to the hydro-ecology of the land
and has left in its wake a peasantry impoverished and alien-
ated from the State. 
The search for an answer in these two cases of resource use
has to begin by looking at the social solidarities that have
gained sway over an uncontested terrain. In the Age of
Development following the Second World War, the State
emerged as the leading carrier of this mission. It developed
in its wake a class of rentiers whose social control over cer-
tain technologies allowed them tremendous benefits. It was
GOVERNANCE
Research project on 
‘comprehensive governance’ 
by CEESP’s Working Group on Governance and Institutions
The special importance of governance for IUCN, as well as all other
players in international environmental politics, stems from the fact
that globalisation has profoundly altered the premises and the
ground-rules for sustainable development, including the management
of eco-systems. It has also altered the status and the roles states
play when promoting and regulating development and environmental
protection. Consequently, the ‘division of labour’ between global,
international, national, regional, and local players shifts and the rela-
tionships between them change. This is particularly the case
between governments, business organisations, NGOs, and players
from civil society. At a national level, one can observe processes of
decentralisation and the emergence of regional and local governance
mechanisms. At the international level there is an increasing frustra-
tion with intergovernmental organisations. New institutional
approaches are emerging and being tested. One can say that, since
the 1980s, environmental policy and policy-making in particular has
shifted from a purely governmental and inter-governmental to a
stakeholder approach. Besides governments and international organ-
isations, stakeholders now include non-governmental organisations
(NGOs), trans-national corporations (TNCs), as well as newly emerg-
ing multilateral institutions such as the World Bank (WB), the Global
Environmental Facility (GEF), and the World Trade Organisation
(WTO). Traditional command-and-control policy-making, policy imple-
mentation, and enforcement capacities of nation-states have weak-
ened accordingly.
If IUCN is to be successful in its mission, it must have a thorough
understanding of these shifts in the authority and functions of institu-
tions, players and governance mechanisms. It must be able to detect
where new opportunities are arising as a result of shifts in patterns of
governance, and where continued efforts will bring diminishing
returns. In particular, it will have to understand the changes in levels
of governance, as well as their interrelationships. In other words, it
has to understand these new emerging governance mechanisms, in
order to see how and where it can play a significant role, and how it
can influence this process as a whole. CEESP’s Working Group on
Governance and Institutions, particularly by means of this research
project, seeks to help IUCN think through what ‘nature conservation’
means in a globalised world. In making recommendations as to how
the various parts of the World Conservation Union can tackle this
issue, the report will build on the fact that IUCN is probably uniquely
positioned to bring together government, business, and NGOs when
promoting sustainable development.
The goal of this working group for the period of Summer 1999 to
Summer 2000 is to elaborate a report assessing the pertinence and
the usefulness of the concept of “Comprehensive Governance” for
IUCN, and to make related recommendations. The report will be
based on a study of existing literature and on analysis of empirical
cases. Water, particularly the management of river basins, is used as
an example from which the concept of ‘comprehensive governance’
is being developed. Various intermediate versions, as well as the
final version of the report and the recommendations will be tested
with researchers, IUCN staff, and relevant decision-makers. In paral-
lel, the process of writing the report will be used for building a con-
stituency of the working group, as well as for proposing a resolution
for the World Conservation Congress in Amman in October 2000,
setting out a mandate for further IUCN work on the topic. The report
will be available in late August 2000. 
Matthias Finger, Professor. mfinger@isp.fr





In early 1999, the IUCN Global Initiative on Climate Change (GICC) was
established, with the goal of strengthening the understanding of the
relationship between climate change and the directives of IUCN – in
particular, the conservation of ecosystems and species, and the
sustainable and equitable use of natural resources.
This development was largely in response to the 1996 World
Conservation Congress, in Montreal, where the Director General was
called upon “to develop a strategy for IUCN on climate change, and to
participate in the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change and the work of the Framework Convention on Climate Change
as far as there is a direct link with the conservation of biodiversity and
natural resources.” As Union momentum built around the issue,
consultations were carried out with IUCN’s technical programmes,
Regional and Country Offices (RCOs), and Commissions to explore
ways to integrate climate change into their respective programmes of
work. These initial efforts helped to outline the form and function of
IUCN’s programmatic response, and to provide the basis for the
Initiative’s launch.
A two-day scoping meeting, hosted by the newly born GICC, at IUCN
Headquarters in Gland in February 1999, attempted to further explore
and clarify IUCN’s approach. The two sessions, involving roughly 20
participants from IUCN’s technical programmes, RCOs, and
Commissions, as well as outside experts, concentrated on taking stock
of the problem and identifying opportunities for IUCN to respond. 
While the discussion reaffirmed the general thrust of the 1996
recommendation, it also expanded upon it by clarifying the need for the
technical programmes, RCOs, and Commissions to become involved in
the development of a co-ordinated approach to climate change. To this
end, the participants established three primary areas of activity which
the Initiative would address: defining ecosystem and species
vulnerability and the ecological limits of climate change; identifying ways
to improve ecosystem resilience in the face of climate change; and
evaluating the role of biodiversity and natural resources in mitigating
climate change. 
Through this process, a set of specific activities for each of the three
types was identified. Cumulatively, these are intended to provide a co-
ordinated approach to the climate change challenge that spans the next
several years. 
From this basis a number of recent activities have stemmed. In
particular, the Initiative has worked with the technical programmes and
RCOs to follow-up on specific activities. For example, in March the
GICC, in co-operation with the Senior Advisor for Social Policy,
convened a meeting at the IUCN Washington Office to discuss how
implementation of the climate change agenda could affect communities.
From these discussions a collaborative project outline emerged,
premised on the notion that those most impoverished and resource-
dependent are also likely to be the ones most vulnerable to changes
and variations in climate, as evidenced by recent events, such as
Hurricane Mitch and the floods in Bangladesh. The project objective was
thus defined as development of a fuller understanding of this
vulnerability, with a long-range view toward enhancing the resilience of
at-risk communities. Through a collaborative workplan, including the
development of case studies, regional and global workshops, publication
of findings and proceedings, and participation in relevant international
fora, the Initiative aims to increase the capacity of IUCN to inform such
climate change coping and adaptation efforts. 
The Initiative co-convened, with the Freshwater Initiative and other
partners, a workshop on Water Resource Management and Global
Change as part of the 13th session of the Global Biodiversity Forum,
held prior to Ramsar COP7. The workshop participants recommended
that a Memorandum of Co-operation be developed between the Ramsar
Convention and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change – a recommendation which the Parties to the Ramsar
Convention (Resolution VII.4) adopted. With the support of the Bureau
of the Ramsar Convention, the Climate Change Initiative and the
Freshwater Initiative are now jointly undertaking a project to facilitate
efforts to explore areas of co-operation between the Ramsar Convention
and the UNFCCC.
The Initiative is contributing to follow-up work from the last negotiations
of the Convention on Biological Diversity – CBD (Bratislava, Slovakia,
May 1998) on the threat posed by climate change to coral reefs and
other coastal and marine ecosystems. The Initiative is planning to
contribute to an upcoming expert workshop, convened by the Secretariat
of the CBD, to discuss the causes and effects of the 1997-98 coral-
bleaching event. Together with the Marine Initiative, a proposal is being
developed to carry out further work, including case studies/assessments
on ecological and socio-economic impacts, and awareness raising and
policy development efforts.
As another follow-up to the CBD meeting, the Initiative is attempting to
facilitate understanding of the treatment of forests in the Kyoto Protocol,
and the implications for forest biodiversity. IUCN has provided analysis
on this topic by jointly preparing with the World Resources Institute a
publication entitled “Climate, Biodiversity, and Forests.” The Initiative is
also actively contributing to the Global Environment Facility’s efforts to
develop an operational programme on carbon sequestration.
More recently, GICC has focused much of its effort on scoping activities
within the RCOs. In July, IUCN ORMA and other IUCN members in
Meso-America, joined in an Initiative-led effort to define key climate
change issues and opportunities for the region, and to develop a
workplan. 
A similar effort was undertaken by the Southern Africa RCOs – and
attended by CEESP – the following month in Johannesburg. Through
the discussions, according to Initiative co-ordinator, Brett Orlando,
participants “recognised that the international climate change agenda is
focused too narrowly on emissions reduction, and that a need exists to
broaden the agenda to include issues such as social vulnerability,
ecosystem integrity, sustainable livelihoods, land-use patterns, poverty,
food security, and social, economic and ecological resilience”. IUCN, it
was agreed, was well placed to catalyse debate, making the climate
change agenda more relevant to the southern African region.
As an example of the output from the Initiative’s regional workshops, the
Johannesburg participants agreed that in the following 18 to 24 months
the RCOs, with the support of the Global Climate Change Initiative,
would undertake the following activities:
• Co-ordination of a series of national workshops, followed by a single
regional workshop to develop a regional framework for the UNFCCC
and COP6 agenda (Autumn 2000/Spring 2001);
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• Development of a work-plan for awareness raising, including a publi-
cation outlining the relevance of climate change to the southern
African region; 
• Design of a research agenda for southern Africa on climate change,
water availability, wetlands conservation, and sustainable livelihoods. 
The Initiative is attempting to shape a third scoping session for the
South and South-east Asia region, where similar potential exists for
identification of region-specific issues, and for the development of an
action agenda on climate change. As a contribution to both regional
work, and that of the Global Initiative, IUCN Pakistan is developing a
paper to review key issues, and further sharpen the role of IUCN in the
climate arena.
Discussions have also begun between GICC and the IUCN South
America Regional Office to explore opportunities to integrate climate
change into the regional programme. In coincidence with this, the
Initiative recently contributed a presentation on the linkages between the
Climate Change Convention and the Conventions on Biological Diversity,
Desertification, and Wetlands to a meeting of the Environment Ministers
from the Amazon countries, hosted by Ecuador’s Minister of
Environment and IUCN president, Yolanda Kakabadse. The meeting
resulted in a Ministerial Declaration to pursue further work on climate
change and ecological and social vulnerability in the region.
Looking toward the October 2000 IUCN World Conservation Congress in
Amman, Jordan, the Initiative is planning to organise a meeting on the
ecological and social limits of climate change. It is envisaged that the
outcomes of the meeting will contribute to the development of an IUCN
quadrennial programme as well as to the COP6 negotiations of the
Climate Change Convention later that year. 
For more information, please contact Brett Orlando, Climate Change
Programme Officer, IUCN Washington Office, 1630 Connecticut Ave.,
NW 3rd Floor, Washington, DC 20009 USA, Tel: ++1 202 387 4826, 
Fax: ++1 202 387 4823, Email: borlando@iucnus.org.
IUCN prepares for second congress
In less than a year (4-11 October 2000) IUCN’s second World
Conservation Congress will be held in Amman, Jordan. It is expected to
be the biggest environmental gathering ever held in the Middle East.
The theme of the Congress is ‘ecospace’. It will address the problem of
the current inadequacy in social and spatial organisation for
environmental management, involving knowledge, empowerment and
governance at global, national and local levels. It will link ecosystem
conservation with the need to stem the global loss of biodiversity, and
build on IUCN’s traditional strengths in species and protected areas.
CEESP will host a day-long workshop at the Congress to report on
progress made during 1996-2000, build consensus on the role social
sciences should play in IUCN’s work and initiate a strategic planning
exercise. Focusing on seeking solutions to environmental problems in
patterns of human behaviour, and building on the insights of social
scientists and philosophers, CEESP will discuss developments within
specific topics: market based instruments, subsidies, resource
mobilisation, trade, governance, ethics, collaborative management,
environmental security, climate change, sustainable livelihoods, gender
and technology. In examining these issues, the workshop may focus on
a particular natural resource such as water and/or coastal zones.
For further information, contact Erika Spanger-Siegfried at:
ceesp@tellus.org.
IUCN in dialogue with the oil industry
The Economics Service Unit and the Social Policy Programme of IUCN
met with representatives from the International Exploration and
Production Association of the oil industry (E&P Forum) in July this year.
IUCN has been exploring collaboration with the E&P Forum to develop
guidelines designed to enhance social impact assessment as part of an
environmental impact assessment for oil and gas operations. Open
dialogue and consultation involving local communities and indigenous
peoples as well as governments are important components of the
development of SIA guidelines.
A workshop convened by the Forum and IUCN is planned as a first step
to develop this process, and this will take place at IUCN HQ in March
2000. Its main goal is to provide an opportunity for oil companies,
governments and the NGO sector to share case studies of social and
environmental impact assessment, and to identify elements of good and
bad practice. Outputs of the workshop will be used in the preparation of
the guidelines.
To be co-sponsored by IPIECA, the workshop will take the form of a two-
day facilitated dialogue revolving around two key themes: consultation
(stakeholders, participation etc); and community rights and benefit and
cost sharing.
For further details, contact Cristina Espinosa, Social Policy Group; email:
cme@hq.iucn.org; or Frank Vorhies, Economics Service Unit; email:
fwv@hq.iucn.org.
IUCN in strategic partnership with World Bank
IUCN and the World Bank signed a memorandum of understanding
creating a new strategic collaboration in June this year. The two
organisations will collaborate in providing “balanced environmental
stakeholder consultation forums, and mediation on emerging
environmental issues” in the field, as well as on a national, regional or
global basis, the agreement says. There will be a focus on building and
strengthening national environmental institutions, especially in the areas
of environmental law and policy, and a staff exchange programme to
promote the sharing of knowledge and expertise.
The two organisations decided to enter into a formal partnership after
exploring the possibilities for co-operation during a four-year pilot
project. One of the key elements of the collaboration in the past four
years has been the establishment of the World Commission on Dams,
and mobilising $7.5 million for its work. The Commission will report back
to the international community in 2001 with recommendations on when,
where, whether and how to build large dams.
Another collaborative effort has been the enlargement of the IUCN as
facilitator of stakeholder consultations for the Bank’s Forest Policy
Strategy development – a multi-year, multi-million dollar programme,
designed to review forest sector issues and the Bank’s role in helping to
reverse global trends of forest loss and degradation. The Forest Policy
Strategy group is also due to complete its work in mid-2000.
At the global level IUCN and the World Bank are working together on
the role of transboundary parks and protected areas in sustaining and
building peace, and planning for the 2002 World Parks Congress
organised by IUCN WCPA in South Africa.  The joint publication of a
four-volume report on a Global Representative System of Marine
Protected Areas has led to the World Bank and IUCN’s setting up
marine protected areas in Samoa and Vietnam, with another under
preparation in Tanzania. These are intended to foster better
management of marine resources and limit the impacts of unsustainable
Meso-American members meet in Guatemala
Meso-American members of IUCN gathered in Guatemala in early
October for the Regional Members’ Forum. Pascal Girot, CEESP
representative for the Region, submitted the report on the last Regional
Policy Network meeting held in San José in July, and on the basis of
this, three key areas of work were identified:
• The monitoring of international conventions (Biodiversity, Climate
Change, CITES, Ramsar etc);
• Trade and Environment; and
• Security and Environment
A further regional steering committee meeting is planned before the end
of the year to establish a comprehensive workplan for 2000.
The Regional Policy Network meeting held in July, enabled participants
to take stock of what is being done in the Region in terms of policy. One
noteworthy initiative is the ARCA, currently led by CEDARENA, an
environmental law organisation based in Costa Rica. ARCA is an
alliance comprising fifteen environmental NGOs, mostly associated with
the Pro Natura groups and with close ties with the Nature Conservancy.
Most are members of IUCN from Central and South America. The main
objective of this alliance is to define common policy goals and work
through different topics relating to national and global policy fora with a
particular interest in practical aspects of collaborative management and
protected areas and forests in the Region. It is hoped that CEESP will
be involved in running a series of workshops and meetings on
collaborative management in the Region in 2000.
‘Mini’ Ring Meeting, Boston, November 1999
The Regional and International Networking Group (RING) took
advantage of another international coming-together at Boston in early
November (the scoping workshop for the proposed Consultative Group
on Sustainable Livelihoods, CGSL) to hold a ‘mini’ Ring planning and
strategy meeting prior to the CGSL. In attendance was Tariq Banuri
(CEESP), Ashok Khosla (DevAlt), George Varughese (DevAlt), Viv
Davies (Ring Coordinator, IIED), Atiq Rahman (BCAS), Saleemul Huq
(Ring Research Driver)), Adil Najam (Ring Research Driver), Tom
Mathews (DevAlt) and Youba Sokona (ENDA).
The meeting provided an opportunity for the Ring members to: discuss
developments and progress since the introduction of the the two new
Ring research ‘drivers’; finalise plans for the two upcoming Ring regional
research meetings, scheduled for early 2000 in W. Africa and India;
discuss the strategy and criteria for enlarging the Ring network;
formalise plans for the next major phase of Ring activity; and discuss the
modalities and agenda for the 4th International Ring Meeting scheduled
for March 2000, in New Delhi.
All in attendance considered the meeting to be highly productive. A full
report is currently being circulated amongst Ring members, and Policy
Matters hopes to include a more detailed account from the meeting and
an outline of future Ring plans in the next issue.
Apologies!
Apologies to Chris Morry and Debbie Gray whose role in the Workshop
on Freshwater Ecosystem Management and Social Security, reported in
the last issue of Policy Matters, was not acknowledged. Chris’ work in
managing the vision project, and the contributions of both he and Debbie
to the drafting of the final report were greatly appreciated. Sorry not to




A Central American conference on trade and environment was held in El
Salvador from 7 to 10 July, sponsored jointly by IUCN (CEESP and the
Meso America Regional Office), IISD, and SICA (the Central American
Integration Secretariat). It gathered over 50 participants from throughout
the sub-region. The programme aimed to identify the Region’s
environmental interests in the trade context, and more particularly to
examine how these interests might be better articulated and defended in
the international trade arena. It built on research on two issues: that of
shaded and organic coffee, and that of environmental services. The first
illustrates the issue of how the trade rules make it difficult for the
consumer to express preference for environmentally-friendly goods. The
second illustrates the potential for new markets for environmental
services - eg. the fixation of atmospheric carbon under the provisions of
the Kyoto Protocol. The meeting adopted a comprehensive action plan,
and established a Trade Working Group under CEESP’s Regional Policy
Network for Central America.
Task force on environment and security
IUCN has recently agreed to the constitution of a Task Force on
Environment and Security. Subject to final confirmation, this Task Force
will be chaired by Mohamed Sahnoun, Special Representative of the
Secretary General of the UN for Africa. It will design and oversee the
production of eight case studies illustrating the link between natural
resource degradation and conflict. These cases will form the basis for a
workshop to be held during the IUCN World Conservation Congress in
Amman, Jordan, in October 2000, and will provide the material for a
book, to be published shortly thereafter.
Coastal Zone Conservation
A set of policy tools for the long-term protection of the Mediterranean
Coastal Zone were agreed at a recent workshop held in Spain. The
recommendations were based on the conclusions of a number of
meetings held over the past five years, which endorsed the need for land
acquisition for conservation.
The resolution calls on States to inter alia facilitate land acquisition and
management for conservation to complement other protection tools, and
to support the creation of organisations dedicated to this objective.
Donors are called upon to incorporate the socio-economic benefits of
coastal land acquisition and management for conservation in their
sustainable development strategies, and to ensure that funding is
streamlined through simplified procedures in order to promote a rapid
response essential in the context of the property market; to support
intervention based on an agreed programme of objectives, rather than
on a case-by-case basis; and to provide for the possibility of other
contributions in addition to the targeted funding provided by public
authorities at State level.
For further information and/or a copy of the policy tools, contact
Christophe Lefebvre, Chair Coastal Zone Conservation Working Group;
email: eurosite@netinfo.fr
Global development network conference:
Bridging knowledge and policy
Bonn, Germany, 5-8 December 1999
The goal of the Global Development Network is to support and
link research and policy institutes involved in the field of
development, and whose work is predicated on the notion that
ideas matter.
See www.gdnet.org/bonn99/index.htm for details.
IUCN council meeting
Gland, Switzerland, 7-9 February 2000
Transdisciplinarity: joint problem-solving 
among science, technology and society
Zurich, Switzerland, 27 February – 1 March 2000
An international conference intended to discuss and develop
transdisciplinary practice and research.  Also aims to create
favourable institutional structures and powerful incentives.
Contact: Transdisciplinarity Conference Secretariat, Swiss
Priority Programme Environment, Langgasstrasse 23, CH-
3012 Berne, Switzerland. Fax: +41 31 3025520; email:
transdisciplinarity@snf.ch;
www.digitalwork.ch/transdisciplinarity/head.html.
The second global knowledge conference:
building knowledge societies
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 7-10 March 2000
The conference will focus on the themes of Access,
Empowerment and Governance.  The Global Knowledge
Partnership is an informal partnership including the World
Bank, UNDP and a number of public, private and not-for-profit
organisations.
See www.globalknowledge.org for details
The South and South-East Asia regional
conservation forum 2000
Vigyan Bhawan, New Delhi, India, 14-17 March 2000
During the four day meeting country presentations will be
made by IUCN members on progress in conservation,
including case studies and lessons learned since the last RCF
in Kota Kinabalu. A workshop will be held on day 3 to discuss
the Regional Programme Framework and will be followed up
by Commission presentations.
Contact: Dr. Zakir Hussain; email: hussain@ait.ac.th
Cultures and biodiversity congress
Kunming, China, June 2000
The costs of globalisation are very high.  Especially alarming
are the limitations external agents place on the problem-
solving potential of local knowledge systems, and the resulting
conflicts experienced by indigenous peoples who have little or
no political space to articulate how they would like life to
continue in succeeding generations.
This ten-day congress will examine ways in which different
indigenous cultures protect their environments. Aimed at
providing a supportive space for dialogue, the congress will
gather members of local communities, natural and social
scientists and environment and development NGOs.
Contact address: Xu Jianchu, Centre for Biodiversity and
Indigenous Knowledge, Kunming, Yunnan, China; email:
cbik@public.km.yn.cn 
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